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CASES NOTED
EAVESDROPPING-TRANSMITTING TO THE
UNINVITED RECIPIENT
The defendant, suspected of practicing medicine without a license,
performed an internal examination on an employee of the witness. At
trial the witness, a private detective, testified as to the conversation he
overheard by means of a radio transmitter concealed in the employee's
purse. On appeal, held, conviction reversed: Testimony obtained by means
of a secret eavesdropping device which transmits the defendant's conver-
sation to an uninvited recipient not within the defendant's premises is
inadmissable under the fourth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.1 Hajdu v. State, 189 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
The right to privacy has not been clearly established as an inde-
pendent constitutional guarantee. Therefore, insofar as an electronic
eavesdropping device involves that right alone, there is no basis for the
exclusion of evidence resulting from its use. Objection may properly be
made, however, based on the admonitions of other definite constitutional
provisos, notably the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule precludes admission of any
evidence secured as a result of an illegal search and seizure." However, a
dramatic limitation was placed on that prohibition in Olmstead v. United
States,4 when the Supreme Court refused to include wiretapping within
its purview. The majority reasoned that there could be neither a "search"
without a trespass,5 i.e., a physical intrusion, nor a "seizure" without
1. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and section 22 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution are the same in meaning and almost
identical in wording.
2. It has been asserted that Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) does establish
such a right. The exact holding, however, is weakened by the unusual number of concurring
opinions. See note 32 infra.
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), was the first Supreme Court case to
recognize the Entick doctrine, in which Lord Camden repudiated the government's inherent
right to intrude upon the privacy of an individual. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell, St. Tr.
1029, 1066 (1765).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), reaffirmed Boyd and went on to declare
the fruits of an illegal search inadmissible. Later this holding was made binding upon the
states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
For a full discussion of the fourth amendment, see Harper, Mr. Justice Rutledge and
the Fourth Amendment, 18 U. Miami L. REv. 48 (1965).
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many Federal decisions brought
to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or . . .
his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house . . .
Id. at 466.
In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Supreme Court applied the
Olmstead test and refused to exclude evidence obtained by means of a detectaphone that
had been placed against the outside wall of the defendant's hotel room. The rationale was
that there had been no trespass. See Justice Murphy's dissent in Goldman, at 136, 138.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), held for the first time that evidence
obtained by electronic eavesdropping (a "spike-mike") was violative of the fourth
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securement of a material object.' Justice Brandeis articulated the minority
position in his dissent. He argued that the right to privacy should not
depend upon technicalities:
The framers of the Constitution conferred, as against the govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.'
Thus, a philosophical dichotomy emerged: while the right to privacy
retained the requirements of trespass and seizure, an influential minority
insisted that the Court's sole concern should be limited to "whether the
privacy of the home was invaded."8
In 1934 a wiretapping policy was codified by section 60$ of the
Federal Communications Act.' Its purpose was well stated by Justice
Murphy:
[C]ongress sought to protect society at large against the evils
of wiretapping and kindred unauthorized intrusions into private
intercourse conducted by means of the modern media of com-
munication, telephone, telegraph, and radio. To that end the
statute prohibits not only the interception and the divulgence
of private messages without the consent of the sender, but also
the use of information so acquired . . .o
In Benanti v. United States" the Supreme Court asserted that the federal
statute should not be contradicted by state legislation. However, the stat-
ute is limited to "interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio";' 2
amendment. Nevertheless, while abandoning the requirement of a technical trespass, the
Court still clung tenaciously to the need for some physical intrusion. It has been asserted
that Silverman made the continued authority of Goldman questionable. See note, 75 HARv.
L. REV. 184 (1961).
6. Suspecting Olmstead of conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act, federal
agents monitored his phone calls by means of several taps. Thus, neither defendant's
person nor his tangible property was seized. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
464 (1928). The obvious problem is that no material object is taken in most eavesdropping
cases. Rather, it is conversation, an intangible, that is seized.
An inroad was made when courts began to treat spoken and written words similarly.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), held that incriminating statements could
be illegally seized.
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
8. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513, (1961) (concurring opinion of
Douglas, J.).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
10. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 125 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
11. 355 U.S. 96, 105-106 (1957).
[K]eeping in mind . . . the public policy underlying Section 605 ...we find that
Congress ...did not mean to allow state legislation which would contradict that
section and that policy . . ..
12. 47 U.S.C. § 605.
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therefore, the states may apply their own law' 3 to locally control the wide
range of secret "bugging" devices loosely incorporated within the term
"eavesdropping." 4
Like most states,' 5 Florida has enacted a statute to regulate wire-
tapping. Section 822.10 of the Florida Statutes provides for the punish-
ment of anyone who "taps or connects . . . by wire or any other means
whatsoever, to or with any telegraph or telephone line so as to hear... any
message going over said line . . . . ,,16 With regard to interceptions im-
plemented by other bugging techniques not involving a telegraph or tele-
phone line, the legislature has remained silent. Aligned with the majority,
Florida courts exclude evidence resulting from such general intrusions
only where an eavesdropping device has actually violated a constitutional
provision."
In Gomien v. State1" a former police officer was convicted for ac-
cepting unauthorized compensation. The Florida Third District Court
of Appeals upheld the admitted transcript of a conversation secretly
obtained because the witness who testified was the one who caused the
conversation to be recorded after he had been invited onto the defendant's
premises. When directly confronted with the question of whether the
recording constituted an illegal search and seizure, the court stated that
the query had already been answered adverse to the defendant in Lopez
v. United States.'9
In Lopez the defendant attempted to bribe an internal revenue agent
who had entered Lopez' office by invitation and secretly recorded the con-
13. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); But see People v. Goldfarb, 34 Misc.
2d 866, 229 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1962).
14. Eavesdropping and wiretapping are often used interchangeably. However, while
the former term encompasses surveillance practices in general, wiretapping shall be limited
here as a special type of eavesdropping involving the telephone, telegraph or radio.
15. Most states have limited their legislation to the regulation of wiretapping; however,
a few include eavesdropping as well. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 640, 653(h), 653(i), 653(j) (as
amended 1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 14-1 to 14-7 (Smith-Hurd 1960); LA. REv.
STAT. §§ 14.322 (1950) ; MD. ANN. CODE, art. 35, §§ 92-99, art. 27, §§ 125A-125D (1957);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 99-102 (Supp. 1959); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 707.320,
200.610-200.690 (1959); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 813a, 813b (1957); N.Y. PEN. LAW
§§ 738-745 (Mckinney 1944); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 141.720, 165.505 (1959).
States that have made no statutory provisions for either eavesdropping or wiretapping
are: Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, Texas, Vermont, and
West Virginia.
16. FLA. STAT. § 822.10 (1965).
17. E.g., Griffith v. State, 111 So.2d 282 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1959).
For a full discussion of the positions taken by the respective states, see Runft, The
Electronic Eavesdropping Threat to the Right of Privacy: Can the States Help? 3 IDAHO
L. REV. 13, 42, 56 (1966); Note, 27 MONT. L. REV. 173, 186 (1966). See generally Comment,
Wiretapping: The State Law, 51 J. CRnI. L. C. & P. S. 534, 536-540 (1961); King,
Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights: Some Recent Developments and Obser-
vations, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 240 (1964).
18. 172 So.2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
19. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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versation in which he was a participant. The resulting transcript was later
introduced to corroborate the agent's testimony. Circumventing the con-
stitutional objection, the Court held that the evidence merely substan-
tiated a private communication to which the defendant had voluntarily
consented.
The holding in Lopez v. United States remains controlling: the mere
use of an electronic eavesdropping device is not legally objectionable; the
law insists "only that the device not be planted by an unlawful physical
invasion of a constitutionally protected area."2 0
In the instant case, the state relied primarily upon Gomien v. State
which the Third District Court of Appeals quickly distinguished. The
court noted that in Gomien the witness had entered the defendant's
premises by invitation and had recorded a transcript of dubious authen-
ticity, whereas here no similar permission was granted to the detective.
Nor was there a transcript involved.2 It was added, however, that if a
recording had resulted from that same device, it would have been admis-
sible after proper authentication.2"
The state's reliance upon Gomien was clearly misplaced for there was
little disagreement that the "invited" witness could testify. The crucial
question posed in the instant case and left untouched by Gomien was
whether an uninvited recipient outside the premises could testify as to
what he overheard via an electronic eavesdropper. It is surprising that
the state did not emphasize On Lee v. United States2 which affirmatively
answered that very question. There the government sent an ex-employee
of the defendant, now turned informer, to the defendant's laundry business
equipped with a secret recorder. The employee induced On Lee to make
several incriminating statements which were overheard by an agent outside
the building. At trial the agent's testimony was held admissible since it
was thought that the absence of a trespass placed the situation outside the
prohibition of the search and seizure clause. The facts in the instant
case are almost identical, yet the results reached by the Supreme Court
of the United States and the Florida Third District Court of Appeals are
diametrically opposed.
It may be validly asserted that the Supreme Court, if afforded the
opportunity, would overrule On Lee,24 and that the result attained by the
20. Id. at 438-39.
21. Hajdu v. State, 189 So.2d 230, 233 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
22. Id. at 234.
23. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
24. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), Chief Justice Warren went so far
as to concur separately "lest Lopez would be interpreted as reaffirming sub silentio" the
decision in On Lee. Id. at 441.
Justices Brennan, Douglas and Goldberg went further by dissenting sharply. They
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third district is a progressive one. Nevertheless, the reasoning employed
by the third district in extending the boundaries of the fourth amendment
is neither responsive to existing law nor definitive in its creation of prece-
dent. The court first purported to delineate boundaries by citing search
and seizure cases in which evidence had been excluded.25 Each, however,
involved a definite trespass.26 Conversely, in the instant case, the mere
introduction of the instrument into the defendant's house was not a
trespass. This conclusion was buttressed by the court itself when it noted
that a properly authenticated transcript resulting from that device would
have been admissible,27 since the instrument was on the person of an
invitee, i.e., the witness' employee. Thus, the inescapable fact remains
that there was no trespass under the present facts and, at least in that
respect, the court proceeded to overstep its own boundaries.
It is submitted that the same result could have been reached in any
one of four ways, not entirely at variance with the present opinion and
more consistent with Florida and federal precedent. First, the Florida
courts could recognize that, although a trespass in its traditional form
will not exist in most eavesdropping cases, the use of any device which
transports or otherwise extends a private communication to an uninvited
recipient does trespass upon the rights of that individual. Usurpation upon
privacy, which is an existing but intangible right, does constitute a "mate-
rial" taking, notwithstanding the absence of a strictly "material" object.
In substance then, such a device facilitates an unwarranted search and
seizure and the result, whether in the form of transcript or testimony,
should be excluded as violative of the fourth amendment.
As alternatives, emphasis could be placed upon the fifth and sixth
amendments, both of which are compatible with the fourth.28 The recent
decision of Miranda v. Arizona29 raises a number of questions yet to be
adequately answered. Often the accused's private statements are elicited
by means which deprive him of an opportunity to use his privilege against
self-incrimination. It may be predicted that any evidence uncovered as
contended that Lopez was an erroneous decision and that it is "rationally indistinguishable"
from On Lee. Id. at 447.
Compare Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Goldman, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), with
his dissent in On Lee. In the latter he made a complete reversal in philosophy, stating:
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead espoused the cause of privacy-
the right to be left alone. What he wrote is an historic statement of that point
of view. I cannot improve on it. On Lee v. United States, Id. at 762-63.
25. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (microphone used by police officers in
the defendant's premises); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ; Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (defendant's papers removed by uninvited party while
defendant was gone); United States v. Stone, 232 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (micro-
phone hidden in telephone booth recorded defendant's private conversation).
26. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
27. Hajdu v. State, 189 So.2d 230, 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
28. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Brock v. United
States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
29. 384 U.S. 436, (1966).
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a result of the government's use of these statements will now be excluded
by Miranda. Certainly this newest exclusionary principle should apply to
private statements unwittingly made in the presence of an electronic
eavesdropper. In such a case the defendant is clearly incriminating himself
without having been informed of his right to remain silent and without
having received the benefit of counsel, as guaranteed by the fifth and
sixth amendments, respectively2 °
Finally, the courts might choose to unequivocally establish a right
of privacy in Florida independent of the fourth amendment. Almost four
decades ago Justice Brandeis implied that such a path was preferable."
In the light of logic and recent decisions by this nation's highest court, 2
this latter route is both tenable and timely.
Electrical information devices for universal, tyrannical womb-
to-womb surveillance are causing a very serious dilemma between
our claim to privacy and the community's need to know. The
older, traditional ideas of private, isolated thoughts and actions
. . . are very seriously threatened by new methods of instan-
taneous electric information retrieval . . . . [R]emedial control
... must be exerted .... What's that buzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzing? 5
SANDRA ROTHENBERG
COMMENT BY PROSECUTOR ON DEFENDANT'S FAILURE
TO TESTIFY AT PRELIMINARY HEARING
The defendant was tried and convicted of aggravated assault. At the
trial he took the stand to testify in his own behalf. During the course of
his cross-examination the prosecuting attorney elicited that the defendant
had not testified at the preliminary hearing. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida, held, decision of the district court quashed: it is not
error for a prosecutor on cross-examination to interrogate the defendant
30. Among the noteworthy statements arising from Miranda are these:
[Wle hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation .... Id. at 1626.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Id at 1628.
For a discussion of Miranda and its impact on the law, see Taran, The New Right-
Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 20 U. MIM I L. REV. 893 (1966).
31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
32. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is one of numerous recent cases
dealing with the right of privacy. Although the holding is inexact with regard to that
right, it is noteworthy that six members of the United States Supreme Court found that
such a right existed. See generally, 64 Micn. L. REv. 219, 229 (1965).
33. McLuHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 12 (1967).
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